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1. Introduction
It might be conjectured that new models of regional economic development, combined with
the emerging understanding of multifunctional agriculture, would suggest a new and perhaps
more optimistic perspective on the potential of agriculture as an engine of regional economic
growth. My purpose here is begin the process of surveying the relevant literature, unraveling
the arguments and gleaning evidence from the published empirical record, and drawing-out
some implications that may help focus our deliberations over the next few days.
Historically, it has been difficult to make the case for agriculture as an engine of economic
development in rural regions. The broad sweep of the evidence has tended to point in the
opposite direction – the rising value of labor in the industrial and post-industrial economy has
tended to draw workers to urban centers, and in so doing depopulate rural regions. To the
extent that the rural population has proven relatively immobile, spatial inequalities in income,
wealth, and opportunity have persisted to the detriment of rural regions. The traditional rural
development agenda has had perhaps three organizing objectives: to correct any market
failures that would disadvantage rural regions disproportionately; to identify niches where
rural communities can compete in the industrial and post-industrial economies, and to find
ways of providing adequate services (especially, but not limited to, health, education, and
communications) to support a desirable quality of life in rural regions.
Europe has its own particular perspective on regional and territorial economic disparities,
arising from a legacy of unequal participation in the industrial revolution, the partition of
Europe into adversarial blocs in the cold war years, and the commitment of the European
Union to economic development in economically lagging regions and economic integration
throughout the EU. More recently, successive waves of EU expansion have magnified the
task of economic integration.
The question motivating this seminar, and this opening keynote address, is whether new
models of regional economic development (e.g. the “new economic geography”), new
insights that have captured a lot of popular attention in recent years (e.g. amenity-driven
g row th , the  “e arth  i s fl at”,  an d  the  “ri se  o f the cre ati ve  cl ass”), an d  new  pe rspe cti ve s on
agriculture as a source of amenities (multifunctional agriculture, MFA) that might attract
worker/consumers and hence growth are sufficient to fundamentally change our perspective
on rural development and economic integration, and change it in a more optimistic direction.
To what extent does the contemporary emphasis on MFA, as opposed to commodity
production agriculture improve prospects for regional economic development and make
agriculture more central to those prospects?2.  Building  blocks
To set the scene for subsequent developments, I begin with a brief review of the
economic role of commodity agriculture, and the concepts of economic geography
based on the work of J. H. von Thunen.
Agriculture, understood as production of food and fiber commodities, allowed
enormous expansion of carrying capacity for humans and generated huge rents – the
cathedrals and palaces of Europe are a tribute to the ability of agriculture to generate
massive surpluses in pre-industrial times. The modernization of agriculture in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries released most of the agricultural labor force, paving
the way in that respect for the industrial revolution. Labor simply matters very much
less than it used to, in the production of food and fiber commodities. Land and natural
resources also matter less, for two reasons: agricultural technologies have been land-
saving as well as labor-saving; and the colonization of the “new world” vastly
expanded the land base and the supply of food and fiber commodities.  For more than a
century now, new-world exporting nations have tolerated a depopulation of the
countryside even greater than Europe’s, and they tend to believe that the relatively
large proportion of the labor force in agriculture in Europe today can be explained only
by maintained impediments to food and fiber imports.
The pioneering economic geography of Thunen assumes a city serving an essential
function (marketing, perhaps), and organizes economic activity around the city on the
basis of a single but very fruitful insight – distance is costly, and it costs more for some
activities than others. The city is located, one presumes, by some initial but unexplained
advantage, and the surrounding countryside is homogenous except for the matter of
distance from the city. The wilderness (land abandoned to economic activity because it is
impossible to generate positive rents by working it) is not infertile badlands; rather, it is
just too distant given prevailing prices and technology – an assumption that allows it to
serve as a reserve to be brought into production should economic conditions warrant it.
An additional purpose served by the wilderness is to isolate the city-state from economic
competition from other city-states.
Thunen’s economic geography leads logically, I think, to core-periphery models of the
regional economy. Urban theorists applied Thunen’s insights to the internal economic
geography of the city which, in their models, was characterized by lower land prices and
increasing lot size with increasing distance from the central business district.  The city
grows to absorb farmland by out-bidding farmers at the urban fringe, and distance from
the city determines the use and value of agricultural land. Basic core-periphery models do
not offer much hope for economic development in the periphery – it is the city that
provides the economic engine for the region, while the hinterlands provide raw materials
and undifferentiated labor that can be bid away by the core.3. The “new economic geography
The new economic geography, NEG (Krugman 1991) was motivated by the desire to
explain a much richer pattern of agglomeration that seems to persist in the real world. With
roots in Krugman’s earlier contributions to the international trade literature, it locates
population concentrations on the basis of some initial advantage in production, and explains
their relative growth mostly by agglomeration efficiencies and, in the case of sophisticated
products, a deepening labor market. NEG’s organizing objectives (Fujita and Krugman
2002) are to explain the economics of location in terms of the whole economy, which
argues for general equilibrium formulations with explicit micro-foundations; and to identify
centripetal and centrifugal forces (forces of attraction and repulsion) that explain
agglomeration and its limits. Monopolistic competition and increasing returns play
important roles in NEG, along with costs of transportation between regions.
In the simplest models, the manufacturing (i.e. urban) sector produces a continuum of
varieties of a horizontally differentiated product; each variety is produced by a separate
firm with scale economies, using workers as the only input. The agriculture sector
produces a homogeneous good under constant returns, using farmers as the only input.
More complex models allow vertical and horizontal differentiation of products and
heterogeneity of urban workers and a picture emerges of highly agglomerated cities as
having deeper labor markets, i.e. greater horizontal and vertical differentiation among
workers, including more highly skilled and specialized workers. NEG is open to the
idea that concentrations of diversified skilled workers (human capital) may attract firms
to a region, especially specialized firms.
Eventually, the idea of agglomeration (from NEG) was added to the core-periphery
models (rooted in Thunen) of the city and surrounding hinterland – increasing
complexity of the urban economy (as well as increasing size) was an advantage, because
it generated cost advantages in production.
Frankly, incorporation of urban agglomeration into core-periphery models does little to
improve the prospects for economic development in the more remote parts of the
periphery.  Agricultural rents may rise with growth of the city (especially for land near
the urban fringe). Beyond the fringe, Thunen-based models permit increasing labor
intensity as land rents rise, but the labor-saving nature of technological progress in
agriculture tends to militate against it.
From the perspective of modern core-periphery models, can commodity agriculture serve
as an engine of regional economic growth going forward? Perhaps it can, in a few
favored places, but it seems very unlikely to do so across the board. After all, commodity
agriculture is peripheral (literally and metaphorically) in a theory of regional growth that
emphasizes agglomeration efficiencies and deepening labor markets.  Not only that, but
there is some empirical evidence for the “resources curse” hypothesis. Gylfason (2000)
presents cross-sectional evidence that natural resource abundance and extensiveagriculture appear to have impeded economic growth in the transition economies in
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia since 1990. Possible explanations are that
heavy dependence on natural resources and agriculture may result in rent seeking (e.g.
corruption) and policy failures (e.g. inflation), and may induce a complacency that
discourages genuine saving, thereby retarding economic growth.
4. Amenity-driven growth
The new economic geography paid no attention to household preferences and hence
locational amenities. But national wage-rent hedonic models, beginning with
Blomquist et al. (1988), have indicated consistently that high-amenity regions have an
advantage in attracting workers and consumers.  Specifically, they document that at the
margin worker-consumers will accept wage discounts in order to move to (or remain
in) high amenity regions, and demand wage premiums to work in low amenity regions.
Conceptual models show that, under certain conditions, high-amenity regions may
attract residents and thereby experience growth (Irwin et al. 2008).  Three factors help
rural regions (rural amenities, urban disamenities, and urban congestion), and one hurts
(urban efficiencies from agglomeration). To begin sorting-out the impacts of these
various influences in a systematic way, Irwin et al. adapted a simple two-region
dynamic model of regional factor mobility and urban agglomeration (Fujita and Thisse
2002) to examine the role of environmental amenities and urban congestion in core-
periphery patterns of regional development. People are mobile between the two regions
but they must live where they work, so their location decisions are influenced by the
wages and amenity levels prevailing in each region.
In principle, the core-periphery pattern may emerge from some initial advantage in
resources or amenities plus agglomeration effects, so an amenity-driven core-periphery
pattern is possible.  However, as is common in this kind of modeling, assume that an urban
core has arisen due to some historical resource advantage and subsequent agglomeration
effects.  With growth in the urban core, urban disamenities (congestion, pollution, etc.) may
eventually outweigh the production externalities and urban amenities that drove urban
growth, dispersing population and economic activity to the periphery region.  This outcome
is not guaranteed, but depends on the relative amenity endowments of the two regions. For
high amenity periphery regions, the model predicts an irreversible change in population
location so that growth concentrates not in the core but in the periphery. On the other hand,
periphery regions with moderate amenity endowments may gain some population and
production, but will never develop into new core regions. Those regions with amenities
below a certain value will fail to gain population, despite the core’s degradation. Thus, rural
regions may benefit from congestion and pollution in urban regions, but only if they have a
sufficient “pull” of their own.There is some scope for pro-active public policy to promote amenity-driven rural growth.
Local government investment in amenities in the periphery region can attract population and
production to the periphery, but only if the initial amenity endowment is relatively high and
the utility gain from augmenting amenities exceeds the utility loss from additional taxation.
In support of the possibility of amenity-driven growth, I have invoked empirical evidence
that wage premiums and discounts are associated respectively with low-amenity and
high-amenity regions, and modeling results that identify conditions under which urban
disamenities and rural amenities might eventually overcome urban production
externalities, thereby reversing the pattern of urban growth and rural depopulation. In
addition, there is some empirical evidence for amenity-driven growth. Rappaport and
Sachs (2003) have shown not only that coastal counties in the US have experienced
disproportionate economic growth over the last 80 or 90 years, but that their economic
advantage has shifted in that time, with advantages in market access (e.g. seaports)
becoming less important and  advantages in amenities more important.
There seems little doubt that amenities matter to growth prospects and are becoming, if
anything, more important. However, the potential for effective amenity-oriented growth
strategies and policies is much less clear, given that much of what counts as locational
amenities (mountains, lakes, the sea-coast, pleasant climate) in Blomquist et al. and
Rappaport and Sachs are, from the local perspective, givens rather than variables
responsive to policy.
5.Multifunctional Agriculture
Agriculture produces a broad array of valuable amenities in addition to commodity
outputs. The concept of multifunctional agriculture (MFA) is intended to capture the
valuable products, beyond food and fiber commodities, that come from agriculture
(Nilsson et al. 2008).  A list of these products might include open space, wildlife habitat,
environmental amenities, recreation and tourism, rural community vitality, “natural” and
organic food and fiber products, food safety and security, production using traditional
methods and historical buildings and equipment, and cultural landscape. If commodity
outputs alone were at stake, economists would argue, free markets would ensure their
efficient production and pricing.  The MFA concept has economic cogency when non-
commodity outputs are valued but would be unpriced (or systematically underpriced),
and therefore underproduced, in a free-market world.  The economic argument for taking
MFA seriously is a market-failure argument (Romstad 2004) – free markets fail to value
non-commodity outputs fully, and thus to provide incentives for their optimal production
– implying a role for public policy to correct the market failure.
The market failure justification for MFA policy argues for treating place-based regional
economic development policies as distinct from MFA, because they are not so readilyjustified by appeal to market failure.  Therefore, I distinguish value-added agriculture and
amenity-augmenting policies (which I will call MFA) from place-based economic
development policies, because they have quite different rationales and, plausibly, different
impacts on prospects for regional economic growth.
1 Both kinds of objectives are in fact
supported by agricultural policies in the United States and the European Union (Cochrane
and Wojan 2008).  This section of this address is focused on amenity-augmenting policies,
but place-based economic development policies are discussed in a later section.
Various US federal and state programs set aside land in conservation, wetlands, and
grasslands reserves, subsidize environmentally friendly practices, support “natural” and/or
organic production of food and fiber, and provide economic incentives to encourage
agricultural and/or open-space uses of land. In the European Union, MFA objectives are
supported by agri-environmental programs of many kinds, and programs to support
structural adjustment in the farming sector, including investment aid.  In both the US and
the EU, traditional agricultural commodity programs also support MFA objectives (it is
claimed), to the extent that they are defended as supporting rural communities and
traditional values associated with farming (typically, the family farm in the US, and cultural
landscape in Europe).
2
Amenity-augmenting policies and programs for agriculture and rural regions expand the
concept of agriculture to include production of various kinds of amenities.  In contrast to
commoditization, artisanal, regionally-branded, etc. food and fiber products are included
in MFA, as are amenities associated with agriculture; and these approaches introduce
prospects for enterprise diversification, improved viability of peri-urban farms, and
perhaps improved regional economic viability (Clark 2009, and Clark et al. 2007).
However, it is important to recognize that there are perhaps major differences among
regions in their potential to benefit from efficient MFA policies and programs. Regions
vary in their potential for efficient amenity production, with regions high in natural
amenities having clear advantages. Regions differ also in their remoteness from population
centers. Remoteness always imposes costs, but there are differences among MFA products
in the costs of remoteness – amenities that are consumed on-site are more disadvantaged by
remoteness than differentiated products that can be transported readily. Randall (2002,
1 I confess that the distinction I am making between amenity-augmenting policy (MFA) and place-based
economic development policy is inconsistent with both US and European linguistic norms.  US
officialdom avoids the term MFA (perhaps for reasons rooted in international trade concerns – see
Randall 2003, 2007) but recognizes the policy-relevance of payments for ecosystem services, and
programs to promote local, natural, and organic foods as well as more generic access to a safe and
healthy food supply. The US has its framework of rural development programs, too, but views them as
quite distinct from the above MFA-like programs.  It seems that Europeans are more comfortable than I
am, with including place-based regional economic development policies in their notion of MFA.
2 See also the Special Issue Comparing US and European Rural Development Policies,
EuroChoices 7(1).  2008. http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119421781/issue2007) has argued that differences in remoteness imply perhaps substantial regional
differences in efficient green prices, more so for amenities consumed on-site.
6.   Conjectures from the semi-popular literature
The “world is flat” hypothesis. The journalist Thomas Friedman has attracted much
attention with his “the world is flat” hypothesis (2005). Basically, he has argued that the
inexpensive transmission of information allows effective economic competition from
remote regions, an argument he presents in broad generalizations supported by anecdotal
evidence. One imagines a lone individual in a remote village with a laptop computer
Distinguishing Multifunctional Agriculture and Place-based Economic
Development Policies
Consistent with the distinction made here between MFA and place-based
economic development policies, MFA activities and outputs include:
· Control of no point pollution and other negative externalities from
farming
· Food and fiber products that are artisanal, produced by traditional
methods and/or in historic facilities, regionally-branded, etc, and in
some (but not all) cases marketed locally and/or directly
· Agritourism
· Production on farms of amenities (differentiated scenic amenities) and
public goods (water catchments, carbon sequestration)
· Landscape-level amenities associated with agriculture and rural life
(scenic, culture-landscape)
MFA policies and programs are those intended to encourage and reward
MFA outputs.
In contrast, place-based economic development includes public policies,
programs, projects, and investments aimed directly at making rural areas more
competitive in terms of economic activity, employment, and income.  Thus, I
define place-based policies much as the World Bank defines territorial
development policy: “The typical territorial development policy response has
emphasized targeted incentives and large-scale infrastructure to encourage
economic production in lagging areas” (World Development Report 2009, p.
258). In the EU, place-based policies include rural development measures
under Pillar II, infrastructure programs and projects supported by the European
Regional Development Fund, and fiscal transfers to low-income regions.recharged by a portable generator, possibly itself animal or human-powered, competing
effectively in the global market for one or another kind of intellectual product. And
perhaps so – there may be a sprinkling of such cases. But for regional economic
development, we would need to imagine large information-based enterprises emerging in
remote places with surplus labor, and competing effectively in global markets.
It can be argued that this hypothesis is plausible for work that is readily commoditized.
However, most high-value work is not readily commoditized – Leamer (2007)
proposes the following hierarchy from more to less commoditized: type this page; edit
this page; write an article for an economics journal; write a good joke.  For work that is
not readily commoditized, it is reasonable to conjecture that agglomeration efficiencies,
especially the deepening of the labor force, matter.
Post-industrial technology and “the rise of the creative class”. Agglomeration
efficiencies are unlikely to diminish in the post-industrial age, and post-industrial
technology tends to widen the value gap between creative and commoditized work.
The “rise of the creative class” hypothesis (Florida 2002) suggests that cities can prosper
by sustaining an urban environment attractive to creative workers. The creative class
hypothesis adds to the deepening labor force argument by suggesting that creative
workers choose locations with a high level of urban amenities. The hypothesis is that
regional development now depends on novel combinations of knowledge and ideas, that
certain occupations specialize in this task, that people in these occupations are drawn to
areas providing a high quality of life, and thus the essential development strategy is to
create an environment that attracts and retains these workers.
Attention tends to be focused on two distinct aspects of the creative class hypothesis, for
quite different reasons. First, what defines the set of creative workers? The tendency is to
focus on certain occupational and professional groups rather than, say, certain sectors of
the economy, or the higher-wage strata (as one might, if one were identifying high levels
of human capital). This latter distinction matters, if the aim is to test the creative class
hypothesis vis-à-vis the less controversial claim that concentrations of high-human-
capital workers tend to attract innovative firms to a region. Second, the distinction
between the creative class hypothesis and the labor force deepening (i.e. high and
extensively differentiated human capital) hypothesis acquires heightened significance in
the context of America’s “culture wars”. A creative class sub-text that the gay
community includes more than its share of creative workers, and therefore should be
courted rather than repulsed by economically-ambitious cities, tapped into a
contemporary US political controversy, as laws perceived as anti-gay were proposed and
passed in some cities and states.7.   Post-industrial technology, the “creative class” hypothesis, the “world is
flat” hypothesis, and amenity-driven growth – empirical evidence
Post-industrial technology is less dependent on in situ resources, value is provided less
by bulky commodities and more by technologically sophisticated products and services
and information substitutes in considerable degree for transportation. So, intuition
suggests that workers and their employers face lower cost-penalties for locating in
remote regions. The “creative class” hypothesis, the “world is flat” hypothesis, and the
amenity-driven growth hypothesis all depend on the idea that the grip of distance on
economic prospects is loosening.
The creative class hypothesis. Empirical evidence re the “creative class” hypothesis is
mixed and controversial (McGranahan and Wojan 2007, Boschma and Frisch 2007, Gabe
et al. 2007, and Hoyman and Faricy 2009) – and much of the controversy surrounds the
appropriateness of definitions and adequacy of measures of the creative class.
McGranahan and Wojan report a series of empirical studies of recent economic
development performance in US rural and urban counties. Among their results, we find
that creative class presence supports economic growth and is associated with high levels
of natural amenities in rural counties. In urban counties there is a strong association
between creative class presence and growth, although the association with natural
amenities is not so strong. However, as the authors report, these results are sensitive to
th e de fi ni ti on o f the cre ati ve  cl ass:  “… th e  re sul ts de pen d on  a re cast c re ati v e  cl ass
measure, which excludes from the original Florida measure many occupations with low
creativity requirements and those involved primarily in economic reproduction. The
measure conforms more closely to the concept of creative class and proves to be more
highly associated with regional development than the original Florida measure.”
Boschma and Fritsch test the creative class hypothesis with data on regional growth in
Europe. They, too, define the creative class in terms of professions not industries.
Findings include: the presence of the creative class is positively associated with
regional economic growth; health care and education facilities have only modest
association with presence of the creative class; and the regional share of the creative
class among the labor force is positively associated with a climate of openness and
tolerance – urbanization per se is not enough.
Hoyman and Faricy, and Gabe et al. are less inclined to endorse the creative class
hypothesis. Hoyman and Faricy, analyzing data from 276 US metropolitan statistical
areas, report that the presence of the creative class is not related to growth, whereas
human capital predicts economic growth and development, and social capital predicts
average wage but not job growth. Nevertheless, they found that clusters of universities
correlated highly with economic growth. They do not shy from policy recommendations,
warning against the use of “creative class” strategies for urban economic development. Isuspect that different definitions of the creative class help explain the very different
conclusions of Hoyman-Faricy, compared to McGranahan-Wojan and Boschma-Fritsch;
and I am not sure what exactly it means to conclude that high human capital and clusters
of universities help economic growth but the creative class does not.
One way or another, it seems that all three categories (high human capital, the talent
attracted by clusters of universities, and the creative class) are associated with the
deepening of the labor force, so the deepening hypothesis is not rejected. On the
other hand, empirical correlation between deepened labor force and economic growth
is not enough to establish that policies targeted to attracting high-quality workers
constitute an effective development strategy, or to determine what kinds of amenities
are most effective at attracting the right kinds of workers.
“The world is flat” hypothesis. “The world is flat” hypothesis – that information
technology has lowered the costs of distance and hence the economic penalty for
remoteness, dramatically expanding the set of effective competitors in global markets
and equalizing the playing field – has intuitive appeal and some anecdotal support.
Nevertheless, despite Friedman’s hypothesis that distance matters less in the
information age, the long-established empirical result that bilateral trade volume
decreases with distance seems secure. Disdier and Head (2008) completed a meta
analysis of 103 published studies, and concluded that the estimated negative impact of
distance on trade increased around the middle of the twentieth century and has
remained persistently high since then. Furthermore, at the regional level, empirical
research on growth shows that distance still matters in Europe (Basile 2008) and North
America, and its importance may be increasing over time (Partridge et al. 2009, 2008).
If anything, the work of Partridge and colleagues shows that proximity within the urban
system plays a stronger role – stronger than other factors such as market potential and
amenities, and growing stronger over time.  Fast-growing small cities and rural regions
tend to be accessible to large and/or fast-growing cities and, overall, the hinterlands’
population appears to be redistributing itself to be nearer to, if not exactlyin, larger urban
centers. At the intra-regional level, there is evidence suggesting that information
technology complements rather than substitutes for face-to-face interaction. For example,
Sohn et al. (2002) report that in the metropolitan Chicago region information technology
has contributed more to concentration than to dispersion of the urban spatial structure.
How are we to reconcile agglomeration effects, which are large and apparently
growing, with Friedman’s premise that the costs of distance are decreasing? While it
makes sense that agglomeration matters more to high-value work, it is not unimportant
to work that seems readily commoditized. Furthermore, commoditization seems to be a
matter of degree: while routine tasks in the manufacturing of clothing have been
outsourced successfully to remote places with very low wages, the outsourcing of
relatively mundane work in information processing has benefited entrepreneurs in theagglomerated cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad much more than independent
contractors in remote regions.
Amenity-driven growth. As reported above (Section 4), anecdotal evidence and
theoretical modeling support the possibility of amenity-driven growth, at least in favored
locations.  Partridge (2008) regards such cases as exceptions to the general rule
(supported by his extensive empirical research) that proximity more than anything else
drives growth and its influence is if anything increasing.
From an American perspective, this raises a conundrum. In the post-war period (more
than 60 years, now), changes in the distribution of population and income have been
rather dramatic, and the big continuing trends have been the increasing concentration of
population in the coastal regions, the mountain west, and the south (Rappaport and Sachs,
2003). Coastal and mountain regions are considered high-amenity ceteris paribus. The
south enjoys more hours of sunshine than other regions, and electric air conditioning has
reduced the cost of dealing with unpleasantly warm conditions whereas there have been
no comparable advances in accommodating snow and ice in the north. So, a plausible
story can be told of sweeping multi-generational trends in the distribution of the US
population toward places and regions that enjoy amenity advantages.
During this long post-war period, several major cities in the south and the mountain west
(e.g. Atlanta, Denver, Phoenix, San Diego) have emerged as centers of thriving economic
regions. Whatever the natural and amenity advantages of these sites, at some point
agglomeration kicked-in, and the endogenous growth dynamic took over.
3 Over the long
haul, remoteness is endogenous – some remote places become central and some places that
used to be central are at risk of becoming remote.  Suffice it to say that our understanding of
the influence of amenities on economic growth seems incomplete. Perhaps there are some
time-inconsistencies in the evidence and/or our interpretation thereof.
An intuitively appealing generalization is that distance, or conversely proximity,
always matters to growth prospects whereas natural amenities may provide
opportunities for favored places and regions, and cities that strive to maintain a high
level of urban amenities may be rewarded.
Because agglomeration matters less for consumers (e.g. the internet is an efficient
provider of a broad suite of consumer amenities) than for firms, it can be argued that
amenity-seeking consumers will be less disadvantaged by remoteness. Such consumers
will include some who can use information technology to work remotely, but perhaps
even more whose income is independent of their labor contribution. Intuition suggests
3 Krugman (1993), addressed the flip-side of this question – how can Chicago’s regional pre-
eminence be explained, when it seems to have enjoyed few natural advantages?  Using a general
equilibrium model he concludes that, while concentration could have occurred at any of several
sites, once it occurs the endogenous growth dynamic is self-reinforcing.that retirees are likely to be over-represented among footloose amenity-seeking
consumers, and some favored communities will be able to prosper by attracting more
than their share of economically-independent retirees. But, again, evidence is mostly
anecdotal rather than empirical and systematic.
8.   Persistent spatial inequalities and place-based policies
Income differences may exaggerate the magnitude of spatial inequalities in economic
well-being – lower housing costs, lower taxes, and higher amenity levels are just three
of the things that would raise “full income” for some households in relatively remote
regions. Nevertheless, spatial inequalities are real and more persistent than standard
economic theory would predict. Place-based economic development policies are often
invoked to address persistent spatial inequalities.
While the political system (itself place-based – electorates are defined spatially)
continues to support them, the consensus among economists In the US is that place-
based economic development policies are mostly ineffective. The World Bank (World
Development Report 2009) takes a similar position on a global scale – place-based
policies are wasteful and run counter to spatial efficiency.
In the European Union, place-based policies enjoy political support (European
Commission 2006), and the EU maintains a considerable slate of rural development
policies and programs (Cochrane and Wojan 2008). There is a diversity of views among
economists as to the justification and effectiveness of these policies (Bureau 2008,
Winter 2008).
Some empirical evidence can be brought to bear, regarding the impacts of these policies
and programs.  Inter-regional fiscal transfers have long been used in the EU to encourage
economic integration of lagging regions.  Checherita, et al. (2009) examined evidence on
the role of net fiscal transfers to households and EU structural funds for per-capita output
convergence across a large sample of European regions during the period 1995-2005. They
found that net fiscal transfers, while achieving regional redistribution, seem to impede
output growth and promote an “immiserising convergence”: output growth rates in poor
receiving regions decline by less than in rich paying regions. EU structural and cohesion
funds spent during 1994-1999 had a positive, but slight, impact on future economic growth,
mainly through the human development component.  Their summary finding is that the
major place-based economic development policies in the EU have reduced regional income
disparities but not disparities in output per capita.
Given that EU economic integration facilitates trade and encourages foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows among member countries, Borota and Kutan (2008) investigated
the impact of the trade and FDI variables on the growth performance of the EU-15 group.
They report no evidence that trade and FDI have reduced disparities in capital formation.
However, there is evidence that net FDI inflow has accelerated technology transfer,suggesting that FDI has served mostly as a special channel for technological transfers.
While regional disparities in capital formation within the EU persist, to the extent that the
EU integration has caused higher FDI inflows in lagging regions, it is clear that this
process had a beneficial impact on growth via technology transfer.
These recent studies can be interpreted as providing only weak support for place-based
economic development policies in the EU. Transfers raise incomes in lagging regions,
but lower incomes by a greater amount in net-payer regions; in lagging regions, fiscal
transfers have raised incomes but not output; and foreign direct investment in lagging
regions has not reduced disparities in capital formation, but it has served as a vehicle for
technology transfer.
9.   Conclusions
The above review supports some broad-brush conclusions about multifunctional agriculture
and economic development in rural regions.  I begin with two stylized facts and draw-out
some of their implications, and then conclude with some implications for the potential
contribution of multifunctional agriculture to regional economic development.
Stylized fact 1: Ideal MFA policy is mostly about correcting market failures, and is
desirable for all the usual economic reasons (Randall 2002, Romstad 2004). MFA policy
has the potential to internalize the negative externalities from agriculture, and to provide
and/or enhance open space, wildlife habitat, environmental amenities, recreation and
tourism, differentiated food and fiber products (e.g. locally produced, “natural”, and
organic), food safety and security, production using traditional methods and historical
buildings and equipment, and cultural landscape.  To the extent that it actually corrects
market failures, MFA policy will improve quality of life, well-being, and perhaps
incomes in many if not all rural places (farms and villages), regardless of location.
Stylized fact 2: Distance still matters, and conversely remoteness remains an impediment to
growth (Partridge et al. 2008, 2009).  Thus far, the evidence fails to support claims that the
“creative class” and “world is flat” hypotheses offer systematic antidotes to the tyranny of
distance.
4 Amenity-driven growth is possible but does not offer a general panacea. High
levels of natural amenities, and/or educational and cultural amenities may bring prosperity
to some favored places. There are many examples of smaller US cities that seem to be
thriving because of environmental amenities (Coeur d’Alene ID, and Sarasota FL), high
levels of educational and cultural amenities (Charlottesville VA), or both (Missoula MT).
However, it is not clear that college towns and places with natural amenities have in general
excelled in economic growth.
4 It seems not entirely a matter of happenstance that the historian, Geoffrey Blainey, who coined
the term “the tyranny of distance” is Australian.It follows directly from the tyranny of distance that, for regions seeking sustainable
prosperity, there are few quick fixes. Given that remoteness is exogenous in the short to
medium run, the most promising strategies seek to generate a regional advantage in
performance of high-value work, and involve long-term, sustained focus on education,
infrastructure, quality of life, and favorable economic and fiscal policies.
Now we consider some implications for the potential contribution of multifunctional
agriculture to regional economic development.
MFA and regional development objectives (1). Consider ideal MFA policy as
addressed to correcting market failures, and assume MFA increases amenities in rural
areas.  What regional growth response can we expect? It seems the growth response
will vary by region and locality, and will depend on amenity level and remoteness:
· MFA will enhance opportunities for farmers on the urban fringe.  In the US, Clark
(2009) has documented a high level of specifically peri-urban adaptations, including
urban-oriented marketing efforts and adjustments to accommodate new urban neighbors.
For peri-urban farms, diversification is often a viable strategy for farm survival, and is
valued for its contribution to quality of life; and its value is likely to increase as the
markets for locally-grown and regionally-differentiated agricultural products grow.
Nevertheless, the stand-alone contribution of MFA opportunities at the urban fringe to
big-picture economic competitiveness is probably rather modest.
· MFA may provide fertile opportunities for growth in high-amenity rural regions
accessible to centers of agglomeration that offer opportunities for high-value work.
· MFA may generate growth in relatively remote high-amenity regions, especially in-
migration by consumers who are less disadvantaged by distance.  Such consumers are
often (but not always) retirees, which has obvious implications for the age structure of the
local population and the kinds of urban services that that will experience growing
demand. If pensions are received independent of current place of residence, local
expenditures of retirees serve an economic function similar to remittances.
MFA and regional development objectives (2).  Assume the goal is effective place-based
economic development strategies.  As noted above (footnote 1), the European concept of
MFA policy includes some place-based economic development programs. However,
there are limits to the optimism that should greet such policies.  According to a fairly firm
consensus among economists, supported by the smattering of empirical evidence that
exists, place-based economic development policy has its own serious limits.
5
Th e  sco pe  fo r MFA  po l i cy  (as I h av e  define d i t h e re ) in  se rv i ce o f th i s o bje ctive  i s
limited. Remoteness is non-responsive to policy in the short-medium term, and the
amenities that attract high-value workers and foot-loose consumers include many that are
5 This conclusion seems to be congenial to the World Bank (2009), which points to inter-territorial
migration as the solution – people will develop even if many places don’t.relatively non-responsive to policy – proximity to sea, lakes, mountains; pleasant climate;
etc. Basically, amenity-oriented policies, including MFA, are likely to more effective in
stimulating economic growth in the “silk purse” locations than in the “sow’s ears”.
6
A wild card: bio-energy and carbon sequestration may substantially increase farmland
rents.  A s  t h i s  i s  w ri t t e n , d r am at i c  n e w  p o l i cy  co m m i tm e n t s  t o  g re e n  an d  re n e w ab l e
energy and sequestration of greenhouse gases are emerging, and seem likely to raise rural
land rents, food prices, and transportation costs.  Impacts of these developments on the
regional and intra-regional dispersion of population and economic activity are, of course,
speculative. We might expect labor employed in agriculture to increase somewhat, but
not as much as land rents; and this increase would likely be concentrated in regions that
were marginal for agriculture in the absence of these new energy and carbon related
opportunities.  We might expect any growth from this source in remote areas to be offset
by increasing costs of remoteness as transportation costs increase (and the rise in
transportation costs will be tempered by increases in fuel efficiency). The potentially
negative impact of increasing land rents on economic development is likely to be rather
restrained: urban and recreational uses of land seem able readily to outbid agriculture,
and it is perhaps unlikely that agricultural rents will rise enough to reverse that situation.
But, as I indicated, all of this is speculative.
I conclude by returning to a point made earlier.  Market-failure-correcting MFA policy
will improve quality of life, well-being, and perhaps incomes in many if not all rural
places regardless of location.  And this accomplishment, should it be forthcoming, is not
trivial – economic growth for all regions regardless of resources, amenities, and
remoteness is simply not on the cards, and regions in decline face daunting problems
maintaining essential services and quality of life (Kilkenny 2010). Growth is not
everything – regions unlikely to experience growth need to create satisfying futures.
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